September 20, 1999

Reuven Paz
ICT Academic Director

The Radical Islamic struggle against Russia in Chechnya and Daghestan, and the terrorist bombings in Moscow in the last weeks, have brought to light a new Islamic leader, a man known in Russia and the West as Al-Khattab. He is considered to be one of two guerrilla leaders involved in the present Islamist struggle, the other being the Chechen warlord, Shamil Basayev.

To date not much is known about Khattab, and it would seem that he relishes this air of mystery about him. Even the name “Khattab” is probably a nickname. According to several Central-Asia sources his real name is Habib Abd al-Rahman. So far very few photos of him have been published. He is described as being round of face, with a wide flowing black beard, long frizzy hair often worn under a beret, and an ugly scar on his left forearm. Said to be currently 34 years of age, Khattab was born to a Saudi tribe residing in the border area between Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Jordan. Thus he is sometimes referred to as of Saudi origin and sometimes as a Jordanian citizen. That he once had plans to study in the United States implies that he comes from a wealthy family. He currently makes his home in Chechnya, where he is married to two Chechen women.

At the age of 19 Khattab was sent by his family to study in the USA, but it is unknown whether he ever arrived there. Fifteen years ago he appeared among the Arab volunteers in Afghanistan, and it seems that he moved there directly from his residence without beginning a course of study in the U.S.
 

The Road to Dagestan

In 1992 Khattab moved from Afghanistan to Tajikistan to fight with the Islamic opposition against the Communist-backed regime. In 1995 he moved to Chechnya, probably with a group of loyalists of Arab origin, and began training Chechen Islamists. He soon became famous for his bravery and for his repeated successes against Russian armored convoys. This success brought him closer to Shamil Basayev, then one of the Chechen rebel leaders. Basayev is now in partnership with Khattab, whose current title is Commander of the “Islamic Army of Dagestan” in the struggle for an Islamist Chechnya. Russian officials claimed in the media that Khattab is accompanied on every operation by two cameramen to record the engagement.

Khattab runs a training camp at Serzhen-Yurt in Chechnya, which allegedly trains not only Islamists from Chechnya and Dagestan, but from other countries as well. Just as in Afghanistan during the 1980s, Khattab and Basayev are but two of the leaders of various groups—some of which are in permanent rivalry with one another. Beside the personal disputes and the nature of the militants themselves, there are also religious and ideological disputes. It is believed that Khattab has already escaped three assassination attempts, the most recent in 1998.

On August 7^th, Khattab led about 2,000 militants into Dagestan from his base in Chechnya. There he seized control of a number of villages and declared an Islamic republic. The rebels were forced back into Chechnya by Russian troops, only to return to Dagestan on September 5^th. Khattab’s retreat and return coincided with the wave of terrorist explosions in Moscow.
 

Khattab and bin Ladin—partners or rivals?

Khattab is regarded as one of the main proponents of the Wahhabi movement, which in Central-Asia has championed one of the most extreme interpretations of Islamic Jihad, an interpretation developed in Afghanistan by the late Palestinian militant Dr. Abdallah Azzam. Azzam was the spiritual guide of Osama bin Ladin. However, Khattab—unlike some of the Arab Islamists who have led such groups in the past—is neither a religious figure nor a writer of ideology or religio-political commentary.

The Russian media in the days following the Moscow explosions, has made frequent mention of the connection between Khattab and Osama bin Ladin, who is said to have provided both financial aid and manpower to the Islamic rebels in Chechnya and in Afghanistan. Russian officials also claim that financial aid is flowing to the rebels from many sources in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and radical organizations in Pakistan, Turkey and Afghanistan. Some officials have accused Georgia and Azerbaijan of supplying weapons to the Islamic rebels.

There are a number of mysteries surrounding Khattab, not the least of which is his relationship with the other Chechen rebels and with Osama bin Ladin. The source of his finances is obscure. There is also undoubtedly a good deal of disinformation concerning him.
 

A Russian connection?

One of the most interesting puzzles is his relationship with Russian officials. According to the Russian newspaper Izvestiya (June 15^th 1999), men from Khattab’s force were seen in Moscow two months before the bombings. They purportedly came to Moscow to buy uniforms and carried a license for such purchases from the Interior ministry, the Federal Security Service and the Emergency Ministry. This and other similar transactions with the Interior Ministry raise the question of whether Khattab has some official patronage in Moscow.

It is no secret that there is a dispute in the Russian government between several factions as to the reaction to the Islamic struggle in Central-Asia. Each of these factions has its own media, the control of which it shares with rival tycoons and businessmen, and this too is a veritable hothouse for disinformation. In addition, there are Russian businessmen with financial interests in Chechnya, and there is always the possibility that part of this money is used to finance terrorism as well. According to the London-based Arabic language newspaper Al-Hayat (September 17^th), the Russian television network NTV, owned by Vladimir Gussinsky, published a recording of a phone talk between Gussinsky’s greatest rival, businessman Boris Birrizowsky, and “one of the Chechen extremists.” The later urged Birrizowsky to send $2.5 million to support the “terrorist groups.” Birrizowsky in his turn denied the report and blamed his rival for “collaborating with the rebels.”

Some of the Russian media have tried hard to connect Khattab directly with the Moscow explosions, like the Weekly Novaya Gazeta, which wrote a week ago that “Khattab has sworn on the Qor`an to pay each participant in the bombing campaign up to $50,000.” In an interview with NTV, Vyacheslav Izmailov, the author of the Gazeta article claimed that Khattab had recruited ethnic Slavs—including former Russian military personnel—for the terrorist campaign, and had divided them into groups sent to Moscow, St. Petersburg and Rostov.

On the other hand, the Russian Interior Minister claimed in a phone conversation with Lewis Frye the head of the FBI on September 9^th that it was Osama bin Ladin who was responsible for the bombings in Moscow. Yet it seems likely that this was merely an excuse to motivate the Americans to engage in more extensive information gathering in the case, since it is known that the Americans are seeking bin Ladin’s shadow and fingerprints everywhere in the world.
 

Threats and denials

In an interview with Greg Myre of the Associated Press published on September 14^th, Khattab stated that “From now on they will get our bombs everywhere. Let Russia await our explosions blasting through their cities. I swear we will do it.” That interview was held between 9-13 September. On September 14^th, Khattab told the Interfax news agency in Grozny that he had nothing to do with the Moscow explosions. He was quoted as saying, “We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells.”

It should be noticed that so far Khattab, like his partner Shamil Basayev, have spoken only of the struggle against Russia and their goal of reconstructing the Islamic state of 19^th century Dagestan on a Wahhabi foundation. Until now they do have never used the language of bin Ladin or other Arab Islamists who talk about a global Islamic struggle against the West, the U.S. or the Jews. This, by the way, may mean that so far they have no real ties or obligations to bin Ladin and his Front, and are financby Wahhabi sources in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It should also be noted that Khattab’s name did not appear in the intensive investigation of bin Ladin’s network and organization following the bombing of the American embassies in Africa in August 1998. Bin Ladin was indeed quoted several times in recent months as supporting the Chechen struggle, and is even claimed to have twice visited Chechnya during 1999. However, there is as yet no real information as to whether his support of the Chechen or their Islamist allies is more than verbal or ideological.

Khattab also did not appear until recently in the Arab media, including the Islamist media that had reported on Central-Asia and the Islamic struggle there. It would seem that until now he really had no connections with the Arab radical Islamist struggles, not even on the Saudi or Jordanian scene. Whether this will remain true following his recent notoriety is anyone’s guess.