computing in mechanism design
From The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, 2008
Edited by
Steven
N.
Durlauf
and
Lawrence
E.
Blume
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Abstract
Computational issues are important in mechanism design, but have received insufficient research interest. This article briefly reviews some of the key ideas. I discuss computing by the centre, such as an auction server or vote aggregator, and computing by the agents, be they human or software. Limited computing hinders mechanism design in several ways, and presents deep strategic interactions between computing and incentives. On the bright side, novel algorithms and increasing computing power have enabled better mechanisms. Perhaps most interestingly, with computationally limited agents, one can implement mechanisms that would not be implementable among computationally unlimited agents.
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Keywords
algorithmic mechanism design; automated mechanism design; Borda voting rule; bounded rationality; combinatorial auctions; complexity theory; computing by the centre; computing in mechanism design; deliberation equilibrium; elicitor; ex post equilibrium; expressive commerce; fielded combinatorial auctions; fielded expressive auctions; Gibbard–Satterthwaite th; incentive compatibility; maximin voting rule; non-truth-promoting mechanism; mechanism design; performance profile tree; plurality voting rule; preference determination; preference elicitation; pull–push mechanism; revelation principle; strategic computing; tree search; Vickrey auction; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanismHow to cite this article
Sandholm, Tuomas. "computing in mechanism design." The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Eds. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 19 January 2012 <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000563> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.0288
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